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Book Review
David Berman, A Manual of Experimental Philosophy, Jeremy Pepyat Books, Dublin, 2009. Printed
by the Dublin University Press Limited, 118 pages.
REVIEWED BY NANCY MATCHETT
UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN COLORADO
A Manual of Experimental Philosophy documents a project—The Experimental Network in
Psychological Philosophy (ENIPP)—carried out by David Berman in 2008-2009. The guiding prin-
ciple of Berman’s work is that “arm-chair psychology is hands on philosophy, and that at least some
philosophical questions can be usefully examined by means of well-focused psychological experi-
ments and observations” (5). The book describes the project findings, but its primary goal is to
clarify the method and vindicate its use.
By “arm-chair psychology,” Berman has in mind the sort of activity engaged in by modern
philosophers (e.g., Descartes and Berkeley) who used their inner, subjective experience as the start-
ing point for reflection about the nature of both self and world. As Berman recounts its history, this
method of “serious” or “disciplined introspection” was taken up by early psychologists in the late
19th century, but was largely abandoned by both academic disciplines when psychologists pursued
behaviorism and philosophy took its analytic turn. And while psychoanalysis and cognitive-neuro
psychology remain “interested in consciousness and the evidence from introspection, they do not
place much confidence in it” as a way of understanding mind or metaphysical reality (13).
Berman is careful to point out that his method (which he labels Exp Phi) should not be confused
with another contemporary approach (labeled by its proponents as X-Phi) that also goes by the
name of experimental philosophy. Both “underline the need for philosophers to do the simple ex-
periments whose result they think is so obvious that it is not worth doing” (49). But beyond this
they have little in common. X-Phi asks its participants to report their reactions to a thought experi-
ment, and those reports are then used by the X-Philosophers as raw data about the nature of human
concepts (for some examples, see Knobe & Nichols (2008)). This is useful, since it often turns out
that the ways philosophers conceptualize issues are different from the ways of ordinary folk. But X-
Phi does not challenge the commitment to conceptual analysis that has come to dominate academic
philosophy. By contrast, Berman’s Exp Phi requires participants to carry out a variety of mental
experiments themselves, and he explicitly requests that they “try not to think in language” but
simply observe their inner experience (8). So Exp Phi “questions whether philosophy is ultimately
about clarifying the meaning of concepts” and “suggests that unmediated, non-linguistic observa-
tion of reality is the best way to attain philosophical truth” (90).
Two explicit aims of Berman’s project are to “teach a disciplined form of introspection” and
“advance the self knowledge of the project participants” (5), and in addition to performing the
experiments himself, he engages his participants in extended conversation (via email and through
seminars and interviews) designed to ensure that both he, and they, adequately characterize the
“data” they produce. Hence, one way to read this book is as a series of case studies in philosophical
client counseling. It differs from other modalities of philosophical practice in two main ways. First,
where the aims of philosophical counselor are typically practical—alleviating a client’s dis-ease,
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Berman’s aims are more narrowly philosophical—understanding the nature of “mental objects or
mental actions or both” (ENIPP website).  And second, Berman’s clients are almost all “philosophy
graduates, teachers or graduate students,” who are themselves interested in theoretical questions
about the nature of mind (1). For anyone who shares this interest, Berman’s detailed presentation of
both the participants’ initial reports and his follow-up conversations provides a fascinating read,
though as a method of client counseling it may have limited usefulness. In another work, Berman
himself has aptly described it as “philosophical counseling for philosophers” (2008, emphasis added).
The bulk of the book describes the four experiments. In the Dark Space experiment (Ch. 2),
participants are asked to sit in a completely darkened room for several minutes and then, “looking
closely, observe what [they] see” (15). The participant reports are quite various, so one might con-
clude that the experiment fails to show anything useful at all. But Berman treats it as proto-evidence
that there are a variety of “mental types.” This hypothesis is somewhat confirmed by the General
Images experiment (Ch. 5), in which participants are prompted to think about an object (a dog or a
chair) and asked to “introspect on what [they] have in mind apart from the words ‘dog’ and ‘chair’”
(51). Berman contends that his participants fall along a spectrum from non-imagers to strong imag-
ers, and it is in this chapter that he makes the strongest claims for the significance of his method. He
takes it to show that while “images are the clearest conscious objects” some people simply don’t
have them (68), and hence that “image-people don’t realize how mystical it sounds” to talk about
mental images, or even concepts, as objects of conscious experience (69). Rather than treat non-
imagers as somehow impaired or confused, Berman contends that such people experience a differ-
ent psychological reality, and one that contemporary philosophy and psychology tend to ignore or
discount.
The suggestion that both disciplines have wrongly ignored fundamental facts about mental
reality is further developed in Berman’s discussion of the other two experiments. The Three Con-
tainers experiment (Ch. 4) asks participants to reproduce the experiment that led Berkeley to con-
clude that hot and cold are subjective phenomena. Berman does not doubt such properties are
primarily mental, but he does find that what many people actually experience is different than what
Berkeley (and others) assume, and hence that there is much more diversity among the mental ob-
jects that a fully adequate philosophy needs to explain. In a similar vein, the Interrupting Desire
experiment (Ch. 3) is portrayed as both supporting the broadly psychoanalytic view that the self is
often governed by unconscious desires, and as demonstrating that these desires “can be consciously
and deliberately induced” by the self (36). In Berman’s view, such desires are more accurately
described as suppressed than as repressed. And if he is right about this, then philosophical counse-
lors may well be able to do more for their clients than therapists who take a more psychoanalytic
approach.
Is Berman right?  He freely acknowledges that his experiments “do fall below the standard of
experiments in the natural sciences” insofar as the same experiments produce a diversity of con-
flicting results (93). But his final chapter offers a series of carefully nuanced arguments designed to
show that while diversity can arise from poor observation, badly set up experiments, or “minds that
are not able to describe their experience adequately” (99), it could also arise from the fact that
reality contains a wide variety of mental objects, only some of which are available to any given
“type” of human mind. Careful readers will benefit from reflecting on this latter possibility, regard-
less of whether they ultimately endorse Berman’s view.
Nancy Matchett
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Aims and Scope
Philosophical Practice is a scholarly, peer-reviewed journal dedicated to the grow-
ing field of  applied philosophy. The journal covers substantive issues in the areas
of  client counseling, group facilitation, and organizational consulting. It provides
a forum for discussing professional, ethical, legal, sociological, and political as-
pects of  philosophical practice, as well as juxtapositions of  philosophical prac-
tice with other professions. Articles may address theories or methodologies of
philosophical practice; present or critique case-studies; assess developmental frame-
works or research programs; and offer commentary on previous publications. The
journal also has an active book review and correspondence section.
APPA Mission
The American Philosophical Practitioners Association is a non-profit educational
corporation that encourages philosophical awareness and advocates leading the
examined life. Philosophy can be practiced through client counseling, group fa-
cilitation, organizational consulting or educational programs. APPA members
apply philosophical systems, insights and methods to the management of  human
problems and the amelioration of  human estates. The APPA is a 501(c)(3) tax-
exempt organization.
APPA Membership
The American Philosophical Practitioners Association is a not-for-profit educa-
tional corporation. It admits Certified, Affiliate and Adjunct Members solely on
the basis of  their respective qualifications. It admits Auxiliary Members solely
on the basis of  their interest in and support of  philosophical practice. The APPA
does not discriminate with respect to members or clients on the basis of  national-
ity, race, ethnicity, sex, gender, age, religious belief, political persuasion, or other
professionally or philosophically irrelevant criteria.
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